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Abstract
If compliance with a norm does not achieve its purpose, then
its applicability must dynamically be restricted or expanded.
Legal interpretation is a mechanism from law allowing norms
to be adapted to unforeseen situations. We model this mecha-
nism for norms regulating computer systems by representing
the purpose of norms by social goals and by revising the con-
stitutive rules deﬁning the applicability of norms. We illus-
trate the interpretation mechanism by examples.
Introduction and Motivation
Norms regulating computer systems can be modelled in dif-
ferent ways, see, for example, (Boella, van der Torre, and
Verhagen 2008). If norms are represented by hard con-
straints, then computer systems are designed to avoid vio-
lations. Alternatively, if norms are represented by soft con-
straints, then they provide standards that can be violated, and
violations should result in sanctions. Soft constraints allow
agents to optimize their performance by reasoning about the
trade off between respecting the norm and the risk of being
sanctioned.
However, an agent can respect a norm evenwhen the com-
pliance of the norm does not beneﬁt the system, thus wasting
his resources while the system achieves only a suboptimal
state. If norm compliance does not achieve the purpose of
a norm, then its applicability must dynamically be restricted
or expanded.
Legal interpretation is a mechanism from law allowing
norms to be adapted to unforeseen situations. The research
question of this paper is:
• How to model the interpretation mechanism of law, in or-
der to design more ﬂexible computer systems regulated
by norms?
We model norms as plans aiming to achieve the social
goals the members of a society decided to share (Boella and
van der Torre 2007). The legislator could try to specify all
the circumstances to which a norm applies and all the excep-
tional contexts where it does not apply, but, as well known
in the planning community of AI, universal plans rarely are
a practicable strategy. An agent should rather produce a par-
tial plan and revise it when part of it becomes unfeasible.
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In the same way as replanning allows an agent to revise its
plans while keeping ﬁxed its original goals, legal interpre-
tation allows norms to be adapted after their creation to the
unforeseen situations in order to achieve the social goal they
have been planned for.
To model legal interpretation we use the distinction be-
tween regulative norms (obligations, prohibitions and per-
missions) from constitutive rules. While the former, which
are changed only by the legislative system, specify the ideal
behaviour, the latter ones provide, by means of counts-as
deﬁnitions, an ontology of institutional concepts (Boella and
van der Torre 2004). The applicability conditions of legal
rules very often refer to these institutional concepts, rather
than to so called brute facts. To simplify the notation we re-
fer to the former as constitutive rules, and the latter simply
as norms. To model the revision of norms, we use an ex-
tension of Defeasible Logic (DL) (Governatori and Rotolo
2008).
Legal Interpretation
Norms have a conditional structure such as b1, . . . ,bn ⇒O l
(if b1, . . . ,bn hold, then l is obligatory); an agent is com-
pliant with respect to this norm if l is obtained whenever
b1, . . . ,bn is derived. Most logical models of legal reasoning
assume that conditions of norms give a complete description
of their applicability (Sartor 2005). However, this assump-
tion is too strong, due to the complexity and dynamics of
the world. Norms cannot take into account all the possible
conditions where they should or should not be applied, giv-
ing rise to the so called “penumbra”: a core of cases which
can clearly be classiﬁed as belonging to the concept. By
a penumbra of hard cases, membership of the concept can
be disputed. Moreover, not only the world changes, giving
rise to circumstances unexpected to the legislator who intro-
duced the norm, but even the ontology of reality can change
with respect to the one constructed by the law to describe
the applicability conditions of norms. See, e.g., the prob-
lems concerning the application of existing laws to privacy,
intellectual property or technological innovations in health-
care.
To cope with unforeseen circumstances, the judicial sys-
tem, at the moment in which a case concerning a violation is
discussed in court, is empowered to interpret, i.e., to change
norms, under some restrictions not to go beyond the purpose
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from which the norms stem. The distinction between norms
and constitutive rules suggests that legal interpretation does
not amount to revising norms, but to interpreting legal con-
cepts, i.e., to revising constitutive rules.
In this paper we adopt the view that the ontology of legal
concepts is built via constitutive rules having the so-called
counts-as form (Searle 1995): r : a1, . . . ,an ⇒c b. For ex-
ample, a bicycle is considered as a vehicle by the following
constitutive rule:
r0 : Bike(x)⇒c Vehicle(x)
This counts-as rule, if instantiated by any bicycle a, says that
a counts as a vehicle.
Constitutive rules have a defeasible character, for exam-
ple, a bicycle for children cannot be considered as a vehicle:
r1 : Bike(x),ForChildren(x)c ¬Vehicle(x)
r0  r1
As usual in DL, our language includes (1) a superiority re-
lation  that establishes the relative strength of rules and
is used to solve conﬂicts, (2) special rules marked with ,
called defeaters, which are not meant to derive conclusions,
but to provide reasons against the opposite.
The set of norms is ﬁxed: any judge during the interpre-
tation process can argue about their applicability conditions
but cannot either add new rules nor cancel them. Only leg-
islators have the power to change norms.
Norms have the form r : b1, . . . ,bn ⇒O l, for example:
r2 : Vehicle(x),Park(y)⇒O ¬Enter(x,y)
This rule reads as follows: if x is a vehicle and y is a park,
then it is (defeasibly) forbidden for any x to enter y.
Finally, as usually assumed in legal theory (Sartor 2005),
we assign goals to norms. In the social delegation cycle
(Boella and van der Torre 2007) norms are planned starting
from goals shared by the community of agents. However,
such goals play also another role: they pose the limits within
which the interpretation process of the judicial systems must
stay when interpreting norms.
Note that the goal alone is not sufﬁcient to specify a norm,
since there could be many ways to achieve that goal and
some guidance should be given to the citizens. Thus, the
norm works like a partial plan the legislator sets up in ad-
vance. The judicial system is left with the task of dynam-
ically adapting the applicability of the regulative norm by
revising the constitutive norms referring to its applicability
conditions, in order to fulﬁl the goal of the norm also under
unforeseen circumstances.
We deﬁne a set Goal of goals and a function G which
maps norms into elements of Goal. For example, if G (r2) =
road safety, this means that the goal of the rule prohibiting
to enter into parks is to promote road safety.
Checking compliance requires to establish if a norm r :
b1, . . . ,bn ⇒O l is violated by a fact or action l happened
under some circumstances H. Let us assume that r states
that ¬l ought to be the case. However, l is not necessarily
a violation, because we also have to check whether H, via
the constitutive rules, matches with the applicability condi-
tions b1, . . . ,bn of r. In easy cases, these match and l directly
amount to a violation. However, jurists argue that we have
cases where this does not hold, as for example when there
is a discrepancy between the literal meaning of b1, . . . ,bn
and the goal assigned to the rule r by the legislator. If so,
even though H matches with b1, . . . ,bn, we do not have a
violation because H should not match with b1, . . . ,bn. A
non-literal interpretation of b1, . . . ,bn would exclude H as a
circumstance falling within the scope of r, since the goal
of the norm would be achieved anyway: lex magis dixit
quam voluit, the law said more than what the legislator was
meaning to say. Analogously, not all cases in which H mis-
matches with b1, . . . ,bn are not violations. We could have
that lex minus dixit quam voluit, the law said less than what
the legislator was meaning to say: here a non-literal, goal-
based interpretation of r would lead to broaden its applica-
bility scope to match H, thus making the agent a violator.
Example
In this section we describe the interpretation process using
an example, ﬁrst considering a scenario of norm restriction
and second a norm expansion. Suppose Mary enters a park
with her bike, thus apparently violating rule r2 above about
vehicles’ circulation. Police stops her when she is still on
her bike in the park and ﬁnes her. Mary thinks this is un-
reasonable and sues the municipality because she thinks that
here the category “vehicle” should not cover bikes.
In the ﬁrst case the conceptual domain T of the normative
system, corresponding to a set of constitutive rules, allows
us to derive that any bike a is indeed a vehicle. The goal
of the norm r2 is reducing pollution G (r2) = ¬pollution. In
court, the judge has to establish if Mary violated r2 or not.
If T is the case, the judge could argue that Mary should
be ﬁned, as r2 clearly applies to her:
T ={r0 : Bike(x)⇒c Vehicle(x),
r3 : 2 wheels(x),Transport(x),¬Engine(x)⇒c Bike(x)}
But suppose that the judge can show that, if Mary’s case
fulﬁls the applicability conditions of r2 (Mary’s bike is a
vehicle) then a goal which is incompatible with the goal as-
signed to r2 would be promoted. Since G (r2) = ¬pollution,
prohibiting to circulate with bikes in parks would encourage
people to get around parks by car and then walk. This would
be against the goal of r2 and so the judge has good reasons
to exclude that bikes are vehicles when r2 should be applied.
Accordingly, when arguing in this way, the judge may in-
terpret r2 by reducing its applicability conditions as far as
Mary’s case is concerned. He thus contracts T in order to
obtain in T that Mary’s bike is not a vehicle in the context
of the current situation, by adding a defeater r4 blocking the
Vehicle(x) conclusion: r4 : Bike(x),Park(y)c ¬Vehicle(x)
and by stating that r4 is stronger than r0: = {r0  r4}.
In the second case, consider the conceptual domain T ′ to
exclude that bikes are vehicles and the goal of r2 could be
the safety of people walking in the park (pedestrian safety):
T ′ ={r3 : 2 wheels(x), Transport(x), ¬Engine(x)⇒c Bike(x),
r5 : Bike(x)c Vehicle(x),
r6 : Transport(x),¬Engine(x)⇒c ¬Vehicle(x)}
={r6  r5}
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T ′ includes r6, which states that, if we know that some x
has purpose of transport and no engine we defeasibly derive
that it is not a vehicle. However, due to r5, if x is a bike,
then we have reasons to block other rules which would lead
to exclude that x is a vehicle. In T ′ r6 is made weaker than
r5 via the superiority relation.
Now, suppose the judge has to settle Mary’s case start-
ing from T ′. Again, the goal of norms such as r2 may
be decisive. The judge could argue that Mary should not
be ﬁned, as r2 clearly does not apply. But suppose that,
since r2 is not fulﬁlled, this would be against the goal of
r2, which is now pedestrian safety. In this case, the judge
has rather good reasons to consider bikes as vehicles when
r2 is concerned. Hence, the judge may interpret r2 by broad-
ening its applicability conditions as far as Mary’s case is
concerned, and so by revising T ′ in such a way as Mary’s
bike is a vehicle, i.e., by transforming r5 in a defeasible rule:
r′5 : Bike(x)⇒c Vehicle(x).
Related Work and Conclusions
In this paper we introduce a model of extensive and re-
strictive interpretations in statutory law. The contribution
is based on the idea that the interpretation of legal concepts
may require to change the counts-as rules deﬁning them. In-
deed, if our ontology does not classify a bike as a vehicle,
but we have reasons that this is the case, then this implic-
itly leads to conclude that the ontology must be revised and
that a bike, at least in the context under consideration, is a
vehicle. This revision is driven and constrained by consid-
ering the goal of the norms in which these concepts occur.
The full logical framework in defeasible logic, illustrating
the revision mechanism, can be found in (Boella et al. In
press).
In the ﬁeld of normative multi-agent systems, (Grossi
2007) provides an account of counts-as rules in which the
problem of the penumbra is analysed in terms of the notion
of context. A ‘penumbral meaning’ is the set of individuals
on which the contextual interpretation of the concept varies.
However, (Grossi 2007) does not explain how the different
extensions of a concept are dynamically related to the con-
texts depending on the regulative norm whose violation is
discussed.
Several papers in the literature of AI & Law have consid-
ered the role of teleological reasoning in the legal interpre-
tation. (Bench-Capon 2002; Prakken 2002) use goals and
values in frameworks of case based reasoning for modelling
precedents mainly in a common law context. (Skalak and
Rissland 1992) analyses a number of legal arguments even
in statutory law, which include cases close to the ones dis-
cussed here. The proposal which is closer to our contribu-
tion is (Hage 1997). (Hage 1997) addresses, among others,
the problem of reconstructing extensive and restrictive in-
terpretation. This is done in Reason-Based Logic, a logical
formalism that can deal with rules and reasons: the idea is
that the satisfaction of rules’ applicability conditions is usu-
ally a reason for application of these rules, but there can also
be other (and possibly competing) reasons, among which we
have the goals that led the legislator to make the rules. All
these approaches in AI & Law highlight the importance of
rule goals, and (Hage 1997), in particular, follows this idea
to formalise extensive and restrictive interpretation. How-
ever, it seems that no work so far has attempted to couple this
view with a framework for reasoning with counts-as rules
and their dynamics.
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